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I.

INTRODUCTION

Moving the U.S. healthcare system toward greater emphasis on
evidence-based medicine ("EBM") is an essential part of the nation's
healthcare reform strategy. The use of clinical practice guidelines ("CPGs")
is one of the main ways that EBM can be implemented. Much has been
written about CPGs, pointing up their potentials and pitfalls. This update
steps off from that foundational and definitional body of work and
highlights some key developments and issues in the CPG movement over
the past two decades. It concludes with a look at the recent work of the
Institute of Medicine ("IOM"), which has long played a leading role in the
promotion of CPGs. The IOM recently concluded a pair of yearlong
initiatives to refine the methodologies by which medical evidence is
systematically reviewed; these reviews will, in turn, provide the data needed
to develop trustworthy and reliable CPGs.
II.

THE IMPERATIVE AND PURSUIT OF COST CONTAINMENT AND THE
ROLE OF CPGs IN THAT QUEST

As President Obama and many others have observed, to have the kind of
inclusive health care system we want in the United States we have to "bend
the cost curve," in other words, halt the seemingly inexorable tendency of
U.S. healthcare expenditures to rise faster than the rate of GDP growth and,
thus, to consume an increasingly large share of our national resources. We
cannot hope to achieve and sustain universal health care ("UHC"), a
national regime where all have adequate access to quality health care,
unless and until we can control the runaway costs of care. Moving the U.S.
healthcare system toward wise and responsible cost containment requires a
multi-step process. First we have to figure out what works in medical care,
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which we do by outcomes research through "systematic review" of the
medical evidence, the core component of EBM. Then, where there are
multiple ways to approach a health care need, we engage in "comparative
effectiveness research" ("CER") to figure out which way(s) works best.
Next, we do an economic analysis, plugging in the cost component to
determine which approach provides the best value for the money a process
known as "cost-effectiveness analysis" ("CEA").1 Finally, when this
analysis is complete, we take the resulting insights and convert them into
CPGs to help practitioners implement in their day-to-day actions what has
been learned. As defined by the IOM in its seminal 1990 report, Clinical
Practice Guidelines: Directions for a New Program,2 CPGs are
"systematically developed statements to assist practitioner and patient
decisions about appropriate health care for specific clinical circumstances."
CPGs are, then, one of the principal mechanisms through which the results
of outcomes research are put into practice, in pursuit of the important goal
of advancing EBM.
III.

IMPEDIMENTS TO THE ADOPTION AND SUPPORT OF

CPGs

Although CPGs have played an increasingly prominent role in health
care for more than a quarter century, there continue to be significant
impediments to their development, adoption and use. The concept of CPGs
is still not universally accepted and supported. Clearly, if they are to
achieve their potential they must be trusted. To be trusted they must be
"trustworthy;" thus, one of the two IOM committees established to work on
this was called the "Committee on Standards for Developing Trustworthy
Clinical Practice Guidelines." I served on that committee and my insights
presented here are largely drawn from that experience.
A.

We Must Have Good CPGs

Obviously, if CPGs are to achieve what they are meant to, they must be
of good quality. At the least, there must be assurance that they meet a
minimum standard of quality. But, despite their having been around and in
use for many years, there are not clearly defined and universally accepted
standards and measures of what a quality CPG is. So, "Job One" is to
1. See, e.g., Ray Robinson, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 307 BRIT. MED. J. 793 (1993),
available
at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC 1696433/pdf/bmjOO0400053.pdf; Uwe E. Reinhardt, 'Cost-Effectiveness Analysis' and U.S. Health Care, N.Y.
TIMES BLOG (Mar. 13, 2009, 6:45 AM) http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/13/costeffectiveness-analysis-and-us-health-care/.
2. INST. OF MED., CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES: DIRECTIONS FOR A NEW PROGRAM 8
(Marilyn J. Field & Kathleen N. Lohr eds., Nat'1 Acad. Press 1990), available at
http://www.nap.edulcatalog.php?record id=1626 [hereinafter DIRECTIONS FOR A NEW
PROGRAM].
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define and disseminate quality standards that will be generally accepted and
followed.
In undertaking this, we do not start from scratch; much of the valuable
foundational work has been done over the past quarter century. The federal
Agency for Health Care Policy and Research ("AHCPR") was created in
1989 largely to help develop, refine and disseminate the methodology for
creating CPGs. Renewed and renamed in 1999 as the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality ("AHRQ")3 , this arm of the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services continues to support outcomes
research, evidence-based practice, and the development and use of CPGs. It
also conducts a variety of activities to enable citizens to be knowledgeable
consumers of healthcare services. The AHRQ maintains the National
Guidelines Clearinghouse ("NGC")4 , and the AHRQ funded the IOM
committees introduced above and discussed below. On the international
front, the Cochrane Collaboration 5 and the Guidelines International
Network 6 have been active proponents and supporters of outcomes research,
systematic reviews, and the development, dissemination, and use of CPGs.
These are just the most prominent and visible contributors to the EBM-CPG
movement; there are many others.
Although the proliferation of guideline-generating organizations and
their CPG products has helped to propel the movement, this embarrassment
of riches poses a problem. With so many players in the game and no clear
rules or controlling organizational structure, a "Tower of Babel" situation is
inevitable. It commonly happens that numerous guidelines exist for a
particular condition or treatment. Some may say essentially the same thing,
but in different ways, so it is difficult to recognize the consensus. Others
may contain significant differences not apparent at a casual reading or even
upon a close reading. Some may be based upon robust evidence and be the
product of careful, skillful analysis, and synthesis; others may be built on a
shaky scientific foundation and may include misinformation, or deliberate
"disinformation." Some may proceed from an auspice, such as a drug
company with a product to push, that has a bias or ulterior motive, and
3. The AHCPR was created through the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989,
Pub. L. 101-239. See Bradford H. Gray et al., AHCPR and the Changing Politics of Health
Services Research: Lessons from the Falling and Rising PoliticalFortunes of the Nation's
Leading Health Services

Research

Agency,

HEALTH

AFFAIRS,

June

25,

2003,

http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/suppl/2003/12/09/hlthaff.w3.283v l.DC1
(detailing
the stormy, politically perilous history of the AHCPR).
4. Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality, National Guideline Clearinghouse
(2010), http://www.guidelines.gov/ (maintained through a contract with the Emergency Care
Research Institute).
5. The Cochrane Collaboration (2011), http://www.cochrane.org/.
6. Guidelines International Network, Welcome to G-I-N (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.gi-n.net/.
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compounding this problem, there are various ways that a CPG's true
auspice can be concealed. Unless those wishing to use CPGs - whether
providers, payors, or consumers of health services and products - can
readily and reliably assess the legitimacy and quality of guidelines, the
CPGs' worth is severely compromised and the guidelines movement is
seriously hampered.
B.

ProvidersMust Accept and Follow Them

Assuming that we can have reliable access to good CPGs, a big
assumption at this point in time, they will not necessarily be universally
adopted and followed. Notwithstanding how helpful CPGs can be in
enabling physicians to stay up-to-date with evolving medical knowledge
and practices and in helping them make treatment decisions - the obvious
raison d'etre of guidelines - some physicians are suspicious of guidelines
and reluctant to follow them and/or participate in their development.
Physicians may question the evidence underlying CPGs, or the
methodology used to generate them, or the competence, objectivity, and/or
motivation of the persons or organizations behind them. In too many cases,
guidelines are presented without sufficient information to enable
prospective users to address these concerns; adequate documentation and
transparency are essential if guidelines are to be accepted as credible.
Moreover, even when a particular guideline is seen as sound, a physician
may not regard it as applicable to a particular patient, or to their patient
population generally. For these reasons, physicians do not uniformly
adhere to guidelines.
Guidelines give general guidance; clearly there will be cases, perhaps
many, where a "one size fits all" approach is not appropriate. A key
challenge, then, is how to identify the exceptional situations and allow
sufficient latitude for individual judgment and for deviation from the
guidelines. Where deviation from the general approach is thought to be
warranted, how should the need for exception be confirmed and
documented? Should physicians have wide latitude to deviate from
guidelines provided they can offer a justification after the fact for the
deviation? Or, if prior approval of a deviation is to be required, what
mechanism(s) or procedure(s) can be devised to make it feasible, and not
overly burdensome, given the exigencies and time pressures of daily
practice?
Another factor complicating the task of convincing physicians to use
CPGs is the natural resistance of professionals to accept standardization of
practice.
Physicians pay dearly to acquire their expertise and the
recognition of it; they are understandably reluctant to give up the latitude
that has traditionally been accorded them to exercise their clinical judgment
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as they see fit. When we have limited knowledge of what works and what
does not in medical care, we must trust the discretion of professionals in the
field and cut them a good deal of slack for making judgment calls, even
when those calls turn out to be wrong. But as the EBM movement
advances our knowledge and medicine increasingly morphs from an art into
a science, society will have less tolerance for medical judgments that are
not rigorously supported by the accumulating evidence. The same advances
that facilitate clinicians' decision-making will constrain that decisionmaking, and no one welcomes constraints, especially not those who have
invested so heavily in their autonomy.'
Another challenge, then, harking back to what was said above, is to
design guidelines that are no more constraining than they have to be - so
that they do not pinch like an ill-fitting corset - and to involve guideline
users in their development so that they see them as reflecting and
embodying their own judgment rather than being imposed by external
forces.
C.

Guidelines Must Not Unduly Impede Medical Advance

Not surprisingly, EBM (and the standardization of medical practice that
it fosters) has the potential to slow medical advance. If we increasingly
require carefully studied evidence that proves an approach to treatment is
effective before adopting it, clinical innovation will necessarily be limited.
To put this into real-world terms, if a health plan will only cover treatments
that are proven effective and cost-efficient, especially if the bar for this
proof is set high, new approaches will be harder to introduce. To achieve
an optimal balance between necessary cost containment and desirable
medical progress there must be adequate opportunities built into the system
for trying new drugs, devices, techniques, and other innovative medical
technologies. Innovation must continue, but it must be managed and
measured. "Life on the (healthcare) frontier" where anything goes is a
thing of the past, not a blueprint for the future.
D.

The Law Must Embrace Them

How the law understands and treats CPGs will surely affect their
acceptance and support by the medical community. There is an inherent

7. See STEPHAN TIMMERMANS & MARC BERG, THE GOLD STANDARD: THE CHALLENGE OF
EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE AND STANDARDIZATION IN HEALTH CARE (Temple Univ. Press
2003).
8. Complicating this matter is the difficulty of distinguishing between "clinical
innovation" and "medical experimentation," the latter being subject to significantly higher
constraints and regulatory requirements. See, e.g., Brook v. St. John's Hickey Mem. Hosp.,
380 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. 1978).
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tension between EBM approaches and the way the law has traditionally
measured whether care rendered was of adequate quality. Deeply imbedded
in the law is the principle that the standard of care is fixed by customary
medical professional practice; a physician is deemed to act properly if he or
she treats a patient as other physicians customarily would in the same
situation.9 To the extent that customary practice incorporates elements that
are not justified by the scientific evidence - e.g., wasteful use of resources,
such as unnecessary testing and procedures, days of hospitalization, etc. physicians who practice according to EBM dictates, and thus deviate from
customary practice, might put themselves at risk of legal liability if
something goes wrong. To put the matter more starkly, if one of the
principal purposes of promoting EBM is to move physicians away from
customary approaches and toward demonstrably more efficient and
effective approaches, but the law continues to use customary practice to
define what is legally required, physicians who practice EBM might find
themselves caught between Scylla and Charybdis.
If CPGs are to aid rather than confound courts' quest for justice in health
care litigation, the law needs to (a) recognize that customary practice is not
always good practice and (b) be willing to admit EBM evidence as proof of
what healthcare providers should do. The first part of this, (a), is not
entirely new. There are court opinions dating back more than a quarter
century, which hold that customary practice is not always the right measure
of what should be done.10 The second part, (b), is somewhat more in
question; courts are nowhere near consensus on whether CPGs should be
admitted as evidence, on what basis, and with what limitations. On the face
of it, CPGs could be inadmissible as hearsay, since they are statements
made outside of court by people, the guideline developers, who were not
under oath at the time the statements were made, and are not present in
court to allow cross-examination or observation of their demeanor."
However, despite being "technical" hearsay, CPGs could be admitted
through one of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule, such as the

9. To make decisions based on customary medical practice, courts must be able to
determine what customary practice is. That is not so easy. Courts typically look to expert
witnesses to inform them of the "standard of practice," but that is a time-consuming,
expensive, cumbersome, and ultimately not very reliable process. CPGs have the potential
to move the fact-finding process past this difficulty and streamline courts' decision-making
in quality of care and coverage of benefits litigation. See, e.g., Arnold Rosoff, EvidenceBased Medicine and the Law: The Courts Confront Clinical Practice Guidelines, 26 J.
HEALTHPOL. POL'Y& L. 327 (2001).
10. See, e.g., Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 452 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. App. Div.
1982); Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974).
11. See, e.g., Hinlicky v. Dreyfuss, 848 N.E.2d 1285, 1289 (N.Y. 2006). See also
Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in
Medical MalpracticeLitigation, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 645, 663 (2001).
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"learned treatise" exception, the "professional reliability" exception, or on
the grounds that they are not hearsay at all because they are not being
offered to prove the truth of what was said outside of court.12
In Hinlicky v. Dreyfuss, the New York Court of Appeals approved
admission of a guideline issued by the American Heart Association and the
American College of Cardiology despite hearsay objections. The court's
rationale was that the guideline was offered not for the truth of the matter
asserted and not to establish a per se standard of care but, rather, for the
non-hearsay purpose of illustrating a physician's decision-making
methodology." Beyond that, there is the question of whether a CPG can be
used by one party in a malpractice or insurance coverage suit to counter
expert witness testimony by the other party, and if so, whether the CPG and
expert testimony evidence should be given equal probative weight. That
question would presumably turn on a court's ability to assess the relative
merit of different CPGs based upon their underlying scientific evidence, the
reputation of their generators, and/or other factors. 14
The ability to distinguish "good" from "poor" CPGs, and the gradients in
between, must be developed, not just for courts, but for other users as well.
How this can best be done is addressed later in this paper. There is also the
question of whether patient-plaintiffs and healthcare providers should stand
on equal footing in their ability to use CPGs in litigation. A Maine law on
the books for approximately twelve years, from 1990 through 2002,
allowed physicians participating in an experimental program to use stateapproved CPGs as a "shield" (exculpatory use) against malpractice suits
while denying patient-plaintiffs their use as a "sword" (inculpatory use)."
In other words, a physician could point to his or her compliance with an
approved guideline as proof that they gave good care, but a patient could
not use the physician's non-compliance with a guideline as evidence that
they did not. This lop-sided allowance of scientific evidence arguably
violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth

12. Hinlicky, supra note 11, at 1289-90.
13. Michael T. Loffredo, Court of Appeals Holds Clinical Practice Guidelines Setting
Forth Standards of Care Are Admissible as Demonstrative Evidence (Aug. 2006),
http://www.clausen.com/index.cfm/fa/firm_pub.article/article/4bae4aba-f089-4169-b790cec297459f7e/.
14. For discussion of federal judges' responsibility to evaluate what scientific evidence
would be helpful to a jury's deliberations and, thus, is admissible, see Daubert v. MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
15. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2971-2978 (repealed 1999). For a thorough
discussion of the pros and cons of using guidelines for inculpatory as opposed to exculpatory
purposes and an empirical analysis of the relative use in reported cases, see Andrew L.
Hyams et al., Medical Practice Guidelines in Malpractice Litigation: An Early
Retrospective? 21 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 289 (1996); Rosoff, supra note 9, at 341.
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Amendment and corresponding sections of the Maine Constitution,16 but the
constitutional infirmity was never challenged or resolved in the courts. In
fact, during the decade when the experiment was in effect it yielded not a
single court case, so there was never an occasion for judicial resolution of
the constitutional issue. Other states followed Maine's lead and its lopsided approach,17 designed to gain physicians' support for CPGs by
neutralizing their fear of the legal risks. This approach was also
incorporated into a number of healthcare reform bills, none of which ever
became law.' 8
Successful implementation of EBM through the use of CPGs will require
a clarification of how the law should treat CPGs. To summarize the
foregoing overview, the key issues the law must resolve are: Should CPGs
be allowed as evidence? If so, should both plaintiffs and defendants be
allowed to use them? (Political considerations aside, this seems a "no
brainer;" certainly both sides should be able to use them.) What weight
should CPG evidence be given and, as a part of that question, how should
courts go about differentiating between "good" and "bad," "better" and
"best" CPGs? This brings us back to the main thrust of this update, the
recent work of the IOM committees to refine and strengthen EBM and the
CPG development process.
IV. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE COMMITTEES WORK TO STRENGTHEN EBM
AND CPGS

The Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 200819
called for the creation of two committees to study ways of improving
systematic reviews of medical evidence: the Committee on Standards for
Systematic Reviews of Comparative Effectiveness Research 2 0 and the
Committee on Standards for Developing Trustworthy Clinical Practice
Guidelines. 2 1 Federal funds, channeled through AHRQ, supported the IOM
16. Jennifer Begel, Maine Physician Practice Guidelines: Implications for Medical
Malpractice Litigation, 47 ME. L. REv. 69, 93, 98-99 (1995) (explaining that such an
allowance is also a violation of Article I, Section 6-A of the Maine Constitution); but see
Mello, supranote 11, at 704-708.
17. FL. STAT. ANN. § 408.02 (repealed 2004); Minn. Stat. 62J.34(3)(a) (repealed 1995).
18. Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103rd Cong. (1993) ; Medical Injury Compensation
Fairness Act of 1993, H.R. 1989, 103rd Cong. (1993) ; Medical Malpractice Liability
Reform Act of 1993, H.R. 1625, 103rd Cong. (1993); Medical Injury Compensation Fairness
Act, S. 1232, 102nd Cong. (1991).
19. Medicare Improvements For Patients And Providers Act of 2008, Pub.L. 110-275, §
304 (2008).
20. See Inst. of Med., Standards for Systematic Reviews of Comparative Effectiveness
Research (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.iom.edu/Activities/Quality/SystemReviewCER.aspx.
21. See Inst. of Med., Standards for Developing Trustworthy Clinical Practice
Guidelines (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.iom.edu/Activities/Quality/ClinicPracGuide.aspx.
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to do this work. The committees were convened in the fall of 2009 and met
throughout 2010. They worked on parallel tracks, with close collaboration
facilitated by interchange among the members, coordinated meetings, and
close interaction between the IOM staff supporting each committee. Their
work was interlinked in that systematic reviews yield the EBM content that
gets embodied in CPGs; thus, in concept, the CPG committee was
"downstream" of the systematic review committee. The committees
concluded their work in early 2011, submitted their reports to Congress, and
released them to the public in March 2011. The two reports are titled
Finding What Works in Health Care: Standardsfor Systematic Reviews and
Clinical Practice Guidelines We Can Trust. To facilitate dissemination of
the committees' deliberations, findings and recommendations, both reports
are available free of charge from the National Academies Press.22
The IOM committees' work and output are closely related to the broader
healthcare reform effort currently underway in the U.S. Reflecting this
paper's opening comments about the need to "bend the cost curve," the
federal healthcare reform legislation passed in March 2010, the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA or, as it is often called, the
"ACA") puts emphasis on "finding what works in health care," the title of
the first IOM report. The ACA creates a nonprofit, public-private body, the
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute, ("PCORI") tasked with
"setting methodological standards for clinical effectiveness research,
including systematic reviews of research findings."23
The IOM
committees' work will afford guidance and direction to PCORI's efforts
toward setting and maintaining high standards for deriving the evidence that
will power the EBM movement. Explaining the need for such standards,
Dr. Harvey Fineberg, IOM's president, said, "[w]hen conducted well, a
systematic review identifies, appraises, and synthesizes the available body
of evidence for a specific clinical question. However, not all of these
reviews meet the appropriate standards of quality and methodology." 24
The chairs of the Systematic Reviews ("SR") committee continued the
explanation in their report's preface, "[t]here are many competing systems
for evaluating and synthesizing evidence, and there are no internationally
agreed-upon standards for how to conduct an SR or create a CPG."25 They

22. Inst. of Med., Clinical Practice Guidelines We Can Trust (2011),
http://www.iom.edu/Reports/201 1/Clinical-Practice-Guidelines-We-Can-Trust.aspx;
Nat'1
Acad. Press, Finding What Works in Health Care: Standards for Systematic Reviews (2011),
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?recordid=13059.
23. INST. OF MED., FINDING WHAT WORK INHEALTH CARE: STANDARDS FOR SYSTEMATIC
REvIEWS ix (Jill Eden et al., eds, Nat'l Acad. Press 2011), available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?recordid=1 3059.

24.
25.

Id.
Id. at xi.
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acknowledged that their committee's standards "set a high bar that will be
difficult to achieve for many SRs, yet the evidence and experience are not
reassuring that it is safe to cut corners if resources are limited. The
standards will be especially valuable for SRs of high-stakes clinical
questions with broad population impact, where the use of public funds to
get the right answer justifies careful attention to the rigor with which the SR
is conducted." 26 Getting healthcare providers to do the right thing is not
just a matter of figuring out what that is, it also entails devising and
implementing payment and incentive mechanisms that reward appropriate
actions. Pay for performance - value-based purchasing or "P4P," as it is
widely referred to 2 7 - Will increasingly be the order of the day in both
governmental and private insurance plans alike. To make this work, there
must be readily accessible, reliable, and accepted measures of clinical
performance. The CPGs fashioned from properly conducted SRs are key to
this initiative. They will provide the clinical performance measures that are
used to implement P4P.
A.

Strengthening What Goes into CPG Development

The standards articulated by the SR committee are in fact quite rigorous,
as are those set out in the CPG committee report. Both put strong emphasis
on the identification, disclosure and management of bias and conflicts of
interest ("COI"). Bias and COI can affect both the SR and CPGdevelopment phases and can arise in a number of ways. Clinicians who are
known for their knowledge and skill in treating particular ailments or for
using and/or perfecting particular treatment approaches and techniques are
the most obvious and likely candidates to be asked to participate in
systematic reviews and in guidelines development related to those
activities. They bring knowledge, expertise and credibility to the process,
but they also potentially bring bias and COI. They may have too strong of
an investment - intellectual, financial and/or institutional - in a particular
drug, device, clinical approach, or treatment technique. The challenge,
then, is to take full advantage of the good elements without undermining the
objectivity or the credibility (perceived objectivity) of the process and the
resulting CPG. The CPG committee's standards call for full disclosure by
prospective panel members of their bias and COI, divestiture of financial
interests that they or close family members might hold, and prohibition of a
member's participation in advisory boards or marketing activities related to
companies with a stake in the subject guideline(s). Chairs and co-chairs of
guideline-generating committees must not have any COI and members with
26. Id. at xii.
27. See, e.g., Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality, Pay for Performance (P4P):
AHRQ Resources (Mar. 2006), http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/pay4per.htm.
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conflicts must be in the minority on a committee. Funders of a guideline
development activity can play no role in it. These are strict standards, but
as the British medical journal, The Lancet, puts it, ". .. tough talk from the
IOM - but much needed talk." 2 8
In addition to putting rigorous constraints on who can participate in
guideline development and in what way, the CPG committee report
provides guidance on the process that committees should follow in
assembling and analyzing the available evidence, in formulating their
recommendations, and in vetting them before presentation to the relevant
professional community(ies) and the general public. Stakeholders should
be identified and given adequate opportunity to have their say, not just
about the scientific validity of a guideline, but also about the impact it is
likely to have when implemented.
B.

And What Comes Out: Clarity, Transparencyand Harmonization of
CPGs

The guideline development process inherently involves group dynamics
and politics. Differences of view around how to phrase conclusions and
recommendations are inevitable. Should a guideline's recommendation(s)
be framed in absolute or near-absolute terms? When a recommendation is
stated as "must" how different is that from "should" or "should consider" or
"should generally"? The variety of language used in CPGs makes for
ambiguity that complicates or frustrates accurate, reliable translation into
action. The committee pushed for greater standardization in language,
advocating the adoption of terms that are consistently used and readily
comprehensible. The strength of a recommendation should be expressed in
a way that the user can readily understand and use to compare two or more
CPGs. The strength of evidence underlying a CPG should, likewise, be
phrased in a way that assures correct understanding and facilitates
comparisons. When a CPG is applicable only to a particular subgroup of
the population - or where the applicability to certain subgroups has not
been adequately tested or established - that should be clearly stated. The
thought process that the guideline developers went through in formulating
the CPG should be evident as part of the guideline. It should not be
distilled down into a form where users have to guess at it. The goal is
transparency. Users of guidelines should be able to access, examine and
understand what went into them. Only then can they properly and
confidently decide whether, when and how to use them.
In a world where so many are engaged in guideline development there
will inevitably be overlapping guidelines that are similar in some respects
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and different in others. The differences may be subtle and comparability
may be made difficult by variability in language and modes of expression.
The NGC and other mechanisms help by assembling guidelines in a given
subject area and making it possible to display them against each other for
easier comparison. Prospective users can "shop" the guidelines and decide
which best suit their needs or the particular case or occasion. But even
when such comparison is facilitated, it can be confusing to have a
multiplicity of similar guidelines. "Harmonization" - the weeding out,
distilling down, and consolidation of related guidelines - can bring some
order to this chaos; so there needs to be a process for periodically compiling
and surveying the guidelines in a particular area and "harmonizing," or
reconciling them. Where two or more guidelines are essentially saying the
same thing, but in different ways, they should be combined. When there
are significant differences that are not readily apparent because of the
language or mode of expression, those differences should be flagged so
they are visible to prospective users. This can be a difficult, politically
sensitive, process. When attempting to fold two or more guidelines into
one, the egos of the developers, both individual and institutional, must be
The challenge of
taken into account and dealt with appropriately.
standardization of practice, touched on above, comes into play here as well.
V.

CONCLUSION

With the issuance of its report, ClinicalPractice Guidelines: Directions
for a New Program, in 1990, the Institute of Medicine helped to shine a
health policy spotlight on EBM and CPGs. Its definition of CPGs as
"systematically developed statements to assist practitioner and patient
decisions about appropriate health care for specific clinical
circumstances" 29 has been widely disseminated and adopted. For some two
decades that IOM report has provided guidance to move the EBM/CPG
movement forward. Now, with its latest work and reports, the IOM has
taken that movement another big step into the future. It is no longer enough
to simply embrace CPGs. To live up to their full potential, clinical practice
guidelines must be "trustworthy." Building upon extensive fact-finding,
consultation, and deliberations by its two committees, the IOM offers new,
more extensive direction for systematic reviews of medical evidence and
the generation of CPGs. It also offers a new definition and prescription to
achieve that end:
Clinical Practice Guidelines are statements that include recommendations
intended to optimize patient care. They are informed by a systematic
review of evidence and an assessment of the benefits and harms of
29.
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alternative care options. To be trustworthy [emphasis
guidelines should:
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supplied],

*be based on a systematic review of the existing evidence;
*be developed by a knowledgeable, multidisciplinary panel of
experts and representatives from key affected groups;
*consider important patient subgroups and patient preferences, as
appropriate;
*be based on an explicit and transparent process that minimizes
distortions, biases, and conflicts of interest;
*provide a clear explanation of the logical relationships between
alternative care options and health outcomes, and provide
ratings of both the quality of evidence and the strength of
recommendations; and
*be reconsidered and revised as appropriate when important new
evidence warrants modifications of recommendations. 30
Here's hoping that the IOM's new formulation will be even more helpful
than the original one was in moving us toward accessible, high quality,
cost-effective health care.
To bend the cost curve by focusing our
healthcare resources on doing what works, we will need all the help we can
get.

30. INST. OF MED., CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES WE CAN TRUST 25-26 (Nat'l Acad.
Press 2011), availableathttp://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record-id=13058.
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